Explore the history of World War II, including pivotal battles, milestone events, and cultural figures, only on History. com. Battle of Midway Wikipedia. The Battle of Midway was a decisive naval battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II which occurred between 4 and 7 June 1. Japans attack on Pearl Harbor and one month after the Battle of the Coral Sea. 678 The United States Navy under Admirals Chester Nimitz, Frank Jack Fletcher, and Raymond A. Spruance defeated an attacking fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy under Admirals Isoroku Yamamoto, Chuichi Nagumo, and Nobutake Kondo near Midway Atoll, inflicting devastating damage on the Japanese fleet that proved irreparable. Military historian John Keegan called it the most stunning and decisive blow in the history of naval warfare. 9The Japanese operation, like the earlier attack on Pearl Harbor, sought to eliminate the United States as a strategic power in the Pacific, thereby giving Japan a free hand in establishing its Greater East Asia Co Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese hoped another demoralizing defeat would force the U. S. to capitulate in the Pacific War and thus ensure Japanese dominance in the Pacific. Luring the American aircraft carriers into a trap and occupying Midway was part of an overall barrier strategy to extend Japans defensive perimeter, in response to the Doolittle air raid on Tokyo. This operation was also considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji, Samoa, and Hawaii itself. The plan was handicapped by faulty Japanese assumptions of the American reaction and poor initial dispositions. Most significantly, American cryptographers were able to determine the date and location of the planned attack, enabling the forewarned U. A new type of History What made the battle of Hong Kong unique was the scale. This was no battle of Berlin with millions of men involved instead just 14,000 defended. 15. donna savalle says 050948 pm i know absolutly nothing about my father who was a prison of war at the battle of bulge. please point me in the right. S. Navy to prepare its own ambush. There were seven aircraft carriers involved in the battle and all four of Japans large aircraft carriersAkagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu, part of the six carrier force that had attacked Pearl Harbor six months earlierand a heavy cruiser were sunk, while the U. S. lost only the carrier Yorktown and a destroyer. After Midway and the exhausting attrition of the Solomon Islands campaign, Japans capacity to replace its losses in materiel particularly aircraft carriers and men especially well trained pilots and maintenance crewmen rapidly became insufficient to cope with mounting casualties, while the United States massive industrial and training capabilities made losses far easier to replace. The Battle of Midway, along with the Guadalcanal Campaign, is widely considered a turning point in the Pacific War. Backgroundedit. The extent of Japanese military expansion in the Pacific, April 1. After expanding the war in the Pacific to include Western outposts, the Japanese Empire had attained its initial strategic goals quickly, taking the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies now Indonesia the latter, with its vital oil resources, was particularly important to Japan. Because of this, preliminary planning for a second phase of operations commenced as early as January 1. There were strategic disagreements between the Imperial Army IJA and Imperial Navy IJN, and infighting between the Navys GHQ and Admiral. Isoroku Yamamotos. Combined Fleet, and a follow up strategy was not formed until April 1. Admiral Yamamoto finally succeeded in winning the bureaucratic struggle with a thinly veiled threat to resign, after which his plan for the Central Pacific was adopted. 1. Yamamotos primary strategic goal was the elimination of Americas carrier forces, which he regarded as the principal threat to the overall Pacific campaign. This concern was acutely heightened by the Doolittle Raid on 1. April 1. 94. 2, in which 1. U. S. Army Air Forces. B 2. 5 Mitchell bombers launched from USS Hornet bombed targets in Tokyo and several other Japanese cities. The raid, while militarily insignificant, was a shock to the Japanese and showed the existence of a gap in the defenses around the Japanese home islands as well as the accessibility of Japanese territory to American bombers. 1. This, and other successful hit and run raids by American carriers in the South Pacific, showed that they were still a threat, although seemingly reluctant to be drawn into an all out battle. 1. Yamamoto reasoned that another air attack on the main U. S. Naval base at Pearl Harbor would induce all of the American fleet to sail out to fight, including the carriers. However, considering the increased strength of American land based air power on the Hawaiian Islands since the December 7 attack the previous year, he judged that it was now too risky to attack Pearl Harbor directly. 1. Instead, Yamamoto selected Midway, a tiny atoll at the extreme northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain, approximately 1,3. Oahu. This meant that Midway was outside the effective range of almost all of the American aircraft stationed on the main Hawaiian islands. Midway was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japans intentions, but the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would therefore be compelled to defend it vigorously. 1. The U. S. did consider Midway vital after the battle, establishment of a U. S. submarine base on Midway allowed submarines operating from Pearl Harbor to refuel and re provision, extending their radius of operations by 1,2. In addition to serving as a seaplane base, Midways airstrips also served as a forward staging point for bomber attacks on Wake Island. 1. Yamamotos plan Operation MIeditMidway Atoll, several months before the battle. Eastern Island with the airfield is in the foreground, and the larger Sand Island is in the background to the west. Typical of Japanese naval planning during World War II, Yamamotos battle plan for taking Midway named Operation MI was exceedingly complex. 1. It required the careful and timely coordination of multiple battle groups over hundreds of miles of open sea. His design was also predicated on optimistic intelligence suggesting that USS Enterprise and USS Hornet, forming Task Force 1. U. S. Pacific Fleet. During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier, USS Lexington had been sunk and USS Yorktown suffered considerable damage such that the Japanese believed she too had been lost. 1. However, following hasty repairs at Pearl Harbor, Yorktown sortied and would go on to play a critical role in the discovery and eventual destruction of the Japanese fleet carriers at Midway. Finally, much of Yamamotos planning, coinciding with the general feeling among the Japanese leadership at the time, was based on a gross misjudgment of American morale, which was believed to be debilitated from the string of Japanese victories in the preceding months. 1. Yamamoto felt deception would be required to lure the U. S. fleet into a fatally compromised situation. 2. To this end, he dispersed his forces so that their full extent particularly his battleships would be concealed from the Americans prior to battle. Critically, Yamamotos supporting battleships and cruisers trailed Vice Admiral Chichi Nagumos carrier force by several hundred miles. They were intended to come up and destroy whatever elements of the U. S. fleet might come to Midways defense once Nagumos carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight gun battle 2. What Yamamoto did not know was that the U. S. had broken the main Japanese naval code dubbed JN 2. Americans, divulging many details of his plan to the enemy. His emphasis on dispersal also meant none of his formations were in a position to support each other. 2. For instance, despite the fact that Nagumos carriers were expected to carry out strikes against Midway and bear the brunt of American counterattacks, the only warships in his fleet larger than the screening force of twelve destroyers were two Kong classfast battleships, two heavy cruisers, and one light cruiser. By contrast, Yamamoto and Kondo had between them two light carriers, five battleships, four heavy cruisers, and two light cruisers, none of which would see action at Midway. 2. The light carriers of the trailing forces and Yamamotos three battleships were unable to keep pace with the carriers of the Kido Butainb 1 and so could not have sailed in company with them.
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